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CORRECTION OF ERROR 
The Appellant incorrectly stated on page 28 of the Appellant's Brief that the 
author of the opinion in In re A. Paul Schwenke, 865 P.2d 1350 (Utah 1993), was Chief 
Justice Durham. The author of that opinion was Chief Justice Hall. 
SCOPE OF THE REPLY BRIEF 
The Appellant will address in this Reply Brief the following issues raised in 
Appellee's Brief: 
(1) Does Rules of Admission ("RGA") apply to Petitioner's Application of 
Readmission? 
(2) Does OPC Counsel's failure to file a timely an objection a harmless error? 
Is the 90 days time constraint an impossible burden on the district court? Does the 90 
days mandatory time constraint create an absurd result? Whose burden it was to make 
sure the hearing was set within 90 days? Does Rule 25 RLDD provide a remedy under 
the circumstances of this case? 
(3) Does Rule 25(f) RLDD command that "[w]ithin 60 days after receiving a 
respondent's petition for reinstatement or readmission, OPC counsel shall.. . (2) file a 
written objection to the petition" (emphasis added), require more than "receipt" of the 
petition by OPC Counsel? 
(4) Does the common receptionist's receipt of the petition for reinstatement the 
same as "receipf' by the OPC Counsel for purposes of Rule 25 RLDD? 
(5) Does the wrongful imposition by the Appellee of the RGA to Appellant's 
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application for readmission a violation of Appellant's Due Process and Equal Protection 
rights? 
(6) Does the Supreme Court's Scheme for the regulation of the legal profession 
a violation of equal protection rights of lawyers in general and Appellant in particular? 
ARGUMENT 
Point One 
The Rules of Admission 14 and 6-1 does not apply 
to Petitioner's Application for Reinstatement or 
Readmission to Membership in the Utah State Bar. 
The Appellee insists that Appellant's application for reinstatement must comply, 
first with the RGA, and second with the requirements of Rule 25 of RLDD. There are 
several reasons why the Bar's Rules of Admissions do not apply to Appellant's 
application for readmission including among others, the rule of construction that holds 
"specific statutes" control over statutes of a "general nature". But these reasons are not 
necessary in this case because this court has already spoken on the matter. Honorable 
Justice Matthew B. Durrant held that Appellant's application for reinstatement should be 
presented to the district court "pursuant to the dictates of rule 25 of the Rules of Lawyer 
Discipline and Disability". Notwithstanding that this court has spoken on the issue, 
Appellee still insist that Appellant's application for reinstatement must comply with the 
RGA first, than also comply with the requirements of Rule 25 of RLDD. There is no 
legal or equitable basis or legal support offered by the Appellee for this court to change 
its holding; and accordingly, Appellee's argument should be summarily rejected. 
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Point Two 
The failure to comply with Rule 25 RLDD's mandatory time 
constraints is not harmless error, is not an impossible burden on the 
district court nor does it create an absurd result. The duty to set a 
hearing is on the district court and finally* Rule 25 provides a fair and 
equitable remedy to this matter. 
Appellee contends that OPC Counsel's objection was timely filed and if it was not 
timely filed, the error was harmless. Moreover, Appellee contends that the 23 days delay 
should be excused for the following reasons: (1) Appellant did not do anything to advance 
the hearing date, (2) it is difficult for the district court to meet the 90 days time constraint, 
and (3) the 90 days limitation could create an absurd result. These arguments are without 
merit. Appellant will first address the 23 days delay arguments. As to the first 
contention, Appellant urges the court to look to the plain meaning of Rule 25. Appellant 
has no duty under the rule to advance the hearing. Rule 25(g) provides that "[i]f an 
objection is filed by OPC counsel, the district court shall, within 90 days of the filing of 
the petition, conduct a hearing..." (Emphasis added). The district court, not Appellant, 
who has the mandatory duty to conduct a hearing within 90 days. 
Appellee next contends that it is difficult for the district court to meet the 90 days 
time constraint. This contention ignores the source of the rule. This court, not the 
legislature, promulgated the rules. This court knows better than any other body what goes 
on, and more particularly, what the procedure and case loads are in the district courts. 
This court promulgated Rule 25 and its strict time constraints with a full appreciation of 
how matters proceed through the district courts. It appears that this court, if it intended 
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to, could have easily used a discretionary term such as "may" in imposing the time 
constraints upon the OPC Counsel and the district court. Instead, this court used the 
imperative term "shall" imposing a mandatory duty. The intent of the mile is clear and 
unambiguous. If the intent of this court when promulgating Rule 25 was other than as 
expressed in its plain meaning, Appellee should provide evidence of the contrary intent. 
That, Appellee has not done. 
Additionally, Appellee's claim of an absurd result is without merit. Appellee 
presented a hypothetical of a Petitioner deliberately delaying serving OPC Counsel with 
the petition in order to cause a violation of the mandatory 90 days constraint. As an 
example of the hypothetical, a Petitioner serves OPC Counsel 40 days after the petition 
was filed. If OPC Counsel took the full 60 days to file its objection, the district court, 
without fault, would not be able to meet the "within 90 days" mandatory requirement for 
a hearing. While this argument has surface appeal, it has no application in the instant 
case for two reasons. First, the hypothetical does not apply to the facts of this case 
because there was no delay in serving OPC Counsel with the petition. Second, if indeed a 
Petitioner is at fault, and he/she was the sole cause of the hearing being held out of time, 
then the Petitioner has arguably waived the right to a hearing within 90 days. 
Appellee also claims that the delay by OPC Counsel in filing its objection to the 
petition is harmless error. This argument, however, is specious and it demonstrates 
Appellee's misunderstanding of the harmless error doctrine. The doctrine applies to 
affirm trial court rulings, notwithstanding a clear error in some part of the proceeding. It 
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is an error committed by the court, not by one of the parties. In fact every Utah case 
where the doctrine was applied involve error by the trial courts as opposed to failure by 
one of the parties to comply with any of its duties.1 This court defined harmless error as 
" . . . an error that is "sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable 
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings."... Put in other words, 
an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high as to 
undermine our confidence in the verdict." Crooks ton v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 
P.2d 789, 796-97 (Utah 1991). In other words, it is an error actually committed by the 
trial court, but the effect of the error is such that it would not make any difference to the 
outcome of the case. 
In this case, all the assigned errors are legal questions regarding the district court's 
interpretation of Rule 25 and the constitutional questions arising from the wrongful acts 
of Appellee and the unfair regulation of the lawyers by one branch of government while 
all other professionals enjoy the benefits of regulation by three separate departments of 
government. To give any credence to Appellee's misapplication of the harmless error 
doctrine is essentially opening the door for appellate courts to weigh factual evidence. 
For example, under Appellee's view, an appellate court can revisit and weigh the facts of 
1
 See for example, Reeves v. Gentile, 1991.UT.111, 813 P.2d 111, 161 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 14 (Utah 1991); Steffensen v. Smith's Management, 1991.UT.264, 820 P.2d 482, 
172 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Utah 1991); Barrett v. Peterson, 1993.UT.336, 868 P.2d 96, 229 
Utah Adv. Rep. 55 (Utah App. 1993); Askew v. Hardman, 1994.UT. 16330, 884 P.2d 
1258, 249 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah App. 1994). 
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a breach of contract. A defendant that breached the contract can argue to the appellate 
court that his one day breach in performing the contract is harmless error? Obviously, 
this approach flies in the face of well established and settled principals governing the 
interaction of the levels of courts in our judicial system. But, since Appellee opened the 
door as to the issue of harm to Appellant, this court is respectfully urged to review the 
totality of the circumstances to see who has really suffered harm in this case. 
Appellee imposed the wrong rule in precluding Appellant from taking the required 
bar examinations. In its zeal to enforce the wrong readmission rule, Appellee neglected 
the time constraints imposed by the proper and controlling Rule 25, RLDD. In the 
process, Appellant was subjected to an enormous waste of time and expense in 
connection with an extra-ordinary petition and a hearing before the district court and 
another extra-ordinary petition to this court. The harm to Appellant cannot be measured 
only the by delays caused by Appellee, but must take into consideration the circumstances 
of the wrongful acts of OPC Counsel to preclude Appellant from taking the examinations. 
Furthermore, Appellee's imposition of the wrong readmission rule also resulted in the 
application of the wrong rule by the Character and Fitness Committee ("committee"). 
Indeed, the committee's recommendation was expressly made pursuant to Rule 14 and 6-
1, RGA, and the thrust of the committee's purported findings were the events in 
connection with the prior disciplinary action that resulted in Appellant's disbarment. To 
find that the harm to Appellant under the circumstances is harmless tantamount to 
condoning the wrongful and discriminatory actions of the OPC Counsel in precluding 
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Appellant from taking the bar examinations, and the committee use of the broad scope of 
the RGA to support a negative recommendation against Appellant. Moreover, the harm is 
not inconsequential. At the time of the "out of time" hearing before the district court, 
Appellant was faced with a hard choice to go forward with the hearing when he obviously 
could not meet two Rule 25 RLDD requirements for readmission; (1) a positive 
recommendation from the committee; and (2) passing the Bar and Professional 
Responsibility examinations, or to dismiss the case so he could appeal the legal issues to 
this court. Please be reminded that Appellant's failure to comply with these 
requirements were due entirely to Appellee's wrongful conduct. If Appellant were to 
proceed with the out of time hearing, he could arguably have waived any of his claims 
against Appellee's wrongful conduct. To highlight Appellee's wrongful conduct, 
Appellant chose to dismiss the petition so he could raise the misconduct issue on appeal. 
The Appellee's wrongful act has also caused over a year and possibly over two years of 
loss of income to Appellant from the practice of his profession. This time is lost forever. 
Therefore, the harm done when viewed in the totality of the circumstances is by no mean 
inconsequential. 
Finally, Rule 25(g) provides that "[i]f no objection is filed by OPC counsel, the 
district court shall review the petition without a hearing and enter its findings and order." 
(Emphasis added). The rule clearly provides for a decision by the district court based 
only on the review of the petition without a hearing. Under the circumstances of this case 
highlighted by Appellee's wrongful conduct; the untimely filed objection by OPC 
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counsel; the untimely hearing, this court is respectfully urged to remand the case to the 
district court to enter its findings and order, without a hearing, but based on the Petition, 
the Confidential Committee Report and the transcript of the hearing before the 
Committee. This is a fair and appropriate remedy that is within the scope of Rule 25. 
However, Appellee contends in footnote 15 to Appellee's brief that this remedy is not 
available because the district court has already denied the petition without a hearing. The 
reality, however, is that the district court dismissed the Petition so Appellant could raise 
the legal issues on this appeal. The district court clearly did not review the Petition and 
all its supporting documents, or any of the other matters in the record including the 
Confidential Committee report, or the transcript of the Committee hearing, when it made 
its ruling from the bench to dismiss the Petition, as requested by Appellant. 
Point Three 
The time limitation for filing an objection to the petition began 
to run following the receipt by OPC Counsel of the petition. 
To justify its late filing of the objection to the Appellant's application for 
reinstatement, Appellee claimed that the petition must be served on OPC Counsel and 
receipt of the Petition by the common reception does not constitute service on OPC 
Counsel. For authorities for the proposition that OPC Counsel was not served at all, 
Appellee points to Rule 17(a) RLDD that applies Rules of Civil Procedure to formal 
discipline "except as otherwise provided in these rules [RLDD]"; and Rule 14 RLDD that 
provides for the service of formal complaints and other papers to be made according to 
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the Rules of Civil Procedure, and case law requiring service upon defendant to invoke the 
court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 
Appellee's arguments are without merit and do no more than cloud the real 
issues. The plain and unambiguous meaning of the Rule 25(f) is that OPC counsel must 
file his objection within 60 days after "receipt" of the petition. The time starts running 
after OPC Counsel received the petition. Appellee admits that the word "receiving" may 
encompass a wide range of acts, that also includes the acts here where the Petition was 
delivered to, and admittedly received, by the common receptionist who gave the Petition 
to the attorney for the Bar Admission Section of the Utah State Bar, the same day. 
Appellee's attempt to apply the Rules of Civil Procedure to justify its action is to 
no avail for at least two reasons. First Rules 17(a) and 14, RLDD, applies only if Rule 
25, RLDD does not address the subject matter. Rule 25(f) expressly provides for the time 
when OPC Counsel must file its objection, so there is no need to look to the Rules of 
Civil Procedure for that. Second, the application of the service of process rule of the 
Rules of Civil Procedure is only in connection with a formal complaint and formal 
disciplinary proceeding. The Appellant's formal disciplinary proceeding was concluded 
in his disbarment almost nine years ago. The Application for Reinstatement is clearly not 
a formal disciplinary proceeding being brought against the Appellant. Accordingly, the 
application of the Rules of Civil Procedure to this reinstatement proceeding would be 
improper under Rules 17(a) and 14, RLDD. 
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Moreover, Appellee's attempt to cloud the issue with jurisdictional case law is 
clearly misplaced. The district court's jurisdiction is not at issue. Under the cases cited 
by Appellee, it is clear that the district court acquires subject matter jurisdiction when the 
complaint is filed and personal jurisdiction over the defendant when he or she is served 
with the summons and complaint. The court must acquire both jurisdictional basis before 
it could grant a valid ruling, order or judgment. But, there is no requirement in the rules 
or the case law that the court must acquire subject matter and in personam jurisdiction 
simultaneously, or that it must acquire one jurisdictional basis before the other. In the 
instant case, the district court acquired in personam jurisdiction over the Appellee on June 
29, 2002, when the Petition was delivered and received by the common receptionist for 
the OPC Counsel, and the district court acquired subject matter jurisdiction on July 3, 
2002, when the Petition was filed with the clerk of the district court. 
Point Four 
The receipt by the common receptionist of the petition 
for reinstatement should be the same as "receipf' by the 
OPC Counsel for purposes of Rule 25» RLDD? 
Appellee insists that the Rules of Civil Procedure requirement for the service of 
the summons and complaint upon an officer, a managing or general agent, or other agent 
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process, controls the service of 
the Petition for reinstatement under Rule 25, RLDD. As discussed above, Rule 25 
provides for the time when OPC Counsel must file its objection; accordingly, there is no 
need to look to the Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, Appellee's claim that personal 
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service under Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is the "only way that the OPC can 
meet its duty to notify each complainant in the disciplinary proceeding that let to the 
respondents suspension or disbarment that respondent is applying for reinstatement..." 
(Emphasis added) is clearly incorrect. OPC Counsel's duty to notify complainants from 
the prior disciplinary proceeding will not be affected by "how" OPC Counsel received the 
Petition but "when" it received the petition. Here OPC Counsel received the Petition 
early enough that it was afforded the maximum time allowed under the rule to file its 
objection. 
In the instant case, the question of when OPC Counsel received the Petition must 
be answered based on the specific facts before this court. This court must decide as a 
matter of law whether or not the receipt of the Petition by the common receptionist and 
attorney for the Bar Admissions office on June 29,2002 is the same as receipt by OPC 
Counsel for purposes of Rule 25, RLDD. The common receptionist admits to receiving 
the petition on June 29, 2002 and giving it to the attorney for the Bar Admissions office 
the same day. Other than claiming Rule 4, Rules of Civil Procedure controls, Appellee 
has not shown why the receipt by the common receptionist and the attorney for Bar 
Admissions is not the same as receipt by OPC Counsel. On the other hand, the common 
receptionist, by affidavit affirmed that she was employed by the Utah State Bar as the 
general receptionist at the Law and Justice Center; that her duties include sorting mail for 
the Utah State Bar and all its departments including OPC Counsel; that she receives hand 
delivered documents for OPC Counsel, and when she does, she date stamped the 
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documents then notify OPC Counsel, who then sends an employee to retrieve them. 
Indeed, OPC Counsel's office is locked and neither the receptionist nor Appellant has 
access to it. It is clear from the receptionist's affidavit that the only point of contact 
between anyone delivering documents for OPC Counsel and OPC Counsel is the common 
receptionist. 
The Utah State Bar and OPC Counsel placed the common receptionist before the 
world as the only point of contact when delivering documents to OPC Counsel. The 
common receptionist is where Appellant has always delivered documents in all matters to 
do with the Bar or any department thereof. It follows, that if receipt by the receptionist of 
the petition is not deemed receipt by OPC Counsel, Appellant would be in a disadvantage 
because OPC Counsel can simply avoid service of the Petition by choosing not to pick up 
the Petition from the receptionist. It is unfair and clearly against the spirit of Rule 25, 
RLDD to allow OPC Counsel a self promoted rule to avoid service of process. 
Accordingly, this court is respectfully urged to hold that the receipt by the receptionist of 
the petition in the instant case is the same as receipt by OPC Counsel for purposes of Rule 
25, RLDD, as a matter of law. 
Point Five 
The wrongful imposition bv Appellee of the Rules of Admission 
to Petitioner's Application for readmission is a violation of 
Petitioner's Due Process and Equal Protection rights? 
Appellee contends that the constitutional issues raised by Appellant for the first 
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time on appeal should not be considered by this court under the general rule that to 
preserve the issue for appeal, it must be presented to the district court first. Appellee also 
contends that under the two prong analysis of a substantive due process claim, 
Appellant's due process right was not violated because he has not been permanently 
deprived of his property interest and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of his property 
interest is minimal. Finally, Appellee sees no violation of Appellant's equal protection 
right because all members of the disbarred lawyer class have to comply with Rules 14 and 
6-1, RGA, and Rule 25, RLDD. Appellant will first address the issue concerning 
Appellant's failure to preserve the constitutional issues for appeal. 
A. Exception to the general rule 
Appellee is correct that generally a party "who fails to bring an issue before the 
trial court is barred from asserting if for the first time on appeal. Espinal v. Salt Lake City 
Bd o/Educ., 797 P.2d 412,413 (Utah 1990). Appellee however, neglected to inform this 
court that there are well established and settled exceptions to the general rule. The 
exceptions are that the "appellate court may address a constitutional issue for the first 
time on appeal if: (1) the trial court committed "plain error;" or (2) there are "exceptional 
circumstances." See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987); State v. Webb, 
790 P.2d 65, 78 (Utah App. 1990). A third exception referred to as the "liberty interest" 
doctrine was first recognized in Utah in In re Woodward, 14 Utah 2d 336, 384 P.2d 110, 
111 n.2 (1963) and followed in Pratt v. City Council of City ofRiverton, 639 P.2d 172 
(Utah 1981) and in State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798 (Utah 1990). 
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Appellant must point out that the liberty interest doctrine, while still valid law in 
Utah, is not favored by both this court and the Court of Appeals especially in criminal 
cases. Judge Judith M. Billings of the Court of Appeals express this view as follows: 
A "liberty interest" exception may be useful in civil appeals, 
like Pratt, as a means of isolating "unusual circumstance" civil 
cases in which an appellate court should consider a 
constitutional issue initially on appeal. In a criminal case, 
however, it is almost always true that the defendant's 
"conviction and sentence rest on the outcome of his [or her] 
appeal." Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 443, and therefore, his or 
her "liberty" is at stake. A per se "liberty interest" exception 
to the rule prohibiting the consideration of issues for the first 
time on appeal would effectively swallow the general rule in 
criminal appeals. State of Utah v. Archambeau, 
1991.UT.252, 820 P.2d 920, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 53 (1991) 
(Emphasis added). 
The point is that the liberty interest doctrine is not favored in criminal cases, but 
continues to be the law in civil cases. Appellant's constitutional due process and equal 
protection claims and his liberty right to earn a living in his chosen profession are at stake 
on this appeal. Accordingly, this court is duty bound under the liberty right exception to 
the general rule to consider the constitutional issues raised for the first time on appeal. 
While the liberty right exception is clearly appUcable to the facts of this case, the court is 
also respectfully urged to consider the plain error exception as well. If this court finds 
that "Shall" as used in Rule 25 RLDD means mandatory, than the district court has 
committed plain error in holding to the contrary, and the constitutional issues must 
therefore, be considered by this court. 
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B. Violation of Appellant's due process right. 
Appellee insists that there has been no violation of Appellant's due process right 
because his private interest in being readmitted to practice law is not permanently 
foreclosed and the risk of erroneous deprivation of his interest to practice law is minimal 
because of the safeguards build in to the RGA procedure. Appellee's argument however 
misses the mark. On the first point, Appellee cited In re Arnovick, 2002 UT 71 for the 
proposition that the new applicant's rejection under RGA does not permanently deprive 
him of the ability to practice law because he can always reapply when he can meet the 
criteria set forth in the RGA. This argument fails with respect to Appellant for at least 
two reasons. This court has already ruled that Appellant's application must be processed 
pursuant to the dictates of Rule 25, RLDD, not RGA. And second, Appellant has already 
practiced law, and each day that he is deprived of practicing law is a permanent loss of 
that day of work. 
On the second point concerning the procedure safeguards of RGA, Appellee 
simply ignored the real issue. It is Appellee's imposition of RGA upon Appellant's 
petition that is the basis of the due process violation. Appellee used the RGA to deny 
Appellant the ability to meet two of the requirements of Rule 25 RLDD. Each day the 
Appellant is deprived of right to practice of his chosen profession is a permanent loss of 
income for that day. If Appellee had not imposed that wrong RGA upon the Appellant's 
application for readmission, Appellant could have been practicing law for over a year 
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now. The loss of over a year is permanent and irreparable. Appellant seeks immediate 
reinstatement as a fair and equitable remedy for the violation of his constitutional rights. 
C. Violation of Appellant's equal protection right 
Appellee admits that disbarred lawyers is a protected class and Appellant is a 
member of that class. Appellee, however, denies that Appellant is being treated 
differently from the rest of the disbarred lawyer class. Appellee is correct that Appellant 
has not provided any evidence that applications for readmission from all members of the 
disbarred lawyer class, except his, are not being subjected to both RGA and Rule 25, 
RLDD. Indeed, if all applications for readmission from all members of the disbarred 
lawyer class have been subjected to both RGA and Rule 25, RLDD, than Appellee is 
correct that Appellant's equal protection right has not been violated. On the other hand, 
Rule 25, RLDD provides a procedure for readmission of disbarred lawyers that is 
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the district court. The plain meaning of Rule 25, 
RLDD does not provide, expressly or inferentially, that the applicants must first meet the 
requirements of RGA before the district court assumes jurisdiction over the application. 
If indeed Rule 25 RLDD is the exclusive procedure for readmission of disbarred 
lawyers, than it is unlikely that very many disbarred lawyers would have been silent if 
they had been subjected to RGA as well. This leads Appellant to believe that many 
readmission applications by disbarred lawyers must have been processed correctly under 
Rule 25 RLDD. Otherwise, the issue would have been raised already by another member 
of the class because no disbarred lawyer could possibly be readmitted if his prior 
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disciplinary matter is revisited and scrutinized under RGA. Appellant seeks immediate 
reinstatement as a fair and equitable remedy for the violation of his constitutional rights 
Point Six 
The Supreme Court's Scheme for Regulation of the legal profession 
violates the equal protection rights of lawyers in general and Petitioner 
in particular. 
Appellee focused its entire argument on the inherent, statutory and constitutional 
power of the Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law with respect to admissions and 
discipline. Appellee again misses the issue. Appellant readily admits that the Supreme 
Court has the governmental power to regulate all aspects of the practice of law under the 
court's inherent power, under statute, and under the Constitution of Utah. Appellant on 
the other hand questions the means by which the power is been applied to regulate the 
practice of law. Under the present scheme, the Supreme Court retains all three powers of 
government in its regulation of the practice of law. Therefore, lawyers are being 
regulated by one branch of government exercising all three powers of government. Since 
all other Utah professionals are being regulated by three separate branches of 
government, lawyers in general and Appellant in particular, are clearly being treated 
differently in violation of their equal protection rights. 
According to the records of the Division of Occupation and Professional Licensing 
("Division'5), as of June 2001, 145,000 professional licensees in 50 general licence 
categories ranging from Accountants, Engineers, to Doctors and Veterinarians, were 
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regulated by the Division under a legislative mandate to administer and enforce specific 
laws related to the licensing and regulation of certain occupations and professions. The 
Administrative branch through the Division executes the laws enacted by the legislative 
branch to regulate the professionals. The professional in any disciplinary proceedings 
after exhausting administrative remedies can eventually seek relief from the independent 
judiciary. Therefore, all Utah professionals regulated by the Division have the full 
benefit of the checks and balances of three separate branches of government, each 
applying a separate power of government, in the regulation of their respective profession. 
Lawyers in general and Appellant in particular, are deprived of the benefits of the 
checks and balances of three separate branches of government regulating their profession. 
In Appellant's prior discipline proceeding, the Bar prepared and placed an affidavit in the 
official records two weeks after the Notice of Appeal was filed. The affidavit purports 
that the Bar investigated Appellant's whereabout by visiting Appellant's fonner office 
address. An unidentified person at the former address purportedly told the Bar's 
investigator that mails are being forwarded to Appellant without identifying the 
forwarding address. The affidavit was illegally placed in the official record. The 
affidavit is inadmissable hearsay. Relying on the affidavit denied Appellant his right to 
confront the affiant. Yet, this court relied on the affidavit to support its finding that the 
service of the formal complaint at Appellant's former address was constitutional. 
Appellant cannot say that the result of his disciplinary matter would have been 
different if the disciplinary process were in the hands of three separate and independent 
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branches of government. But the likelihood of the Executive Branch through the Division 
prosecuting the disciplinary case preparing an affidavit two weeks after the Notice of 
Appeal had been filed and inserting it in the official records maintained by the Judicial 
Branch is virtually non existence. Accordingly, Appellant has suffered irreparable harm 
as a result of being deprived of the benefits of the separation of powers of government in 
his disciplinary case. Appellant seeks immediate reinstatement on the ground that his 
disciplinary case was unconstitutional because he was subjected to a procedure where he 
was deprived of the benefits of the separation of power. Moreover, Appellant's being 
deprived of the benefits of the separation of powers also violates his right to equal 
protection because, except lawyers, all other professionals in Utah are subjected to a 
disciplinary procedure where they receive the benefits of the separation of powers 
doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee's imposition of RGA on Appellant's application for readmission is 
wrongful. As a result of Appellant wrongful act, Appellant was unable to take the 
required Bar and Professional Responsibility exams. Appellant's wrongful act also 
violated Appellant's due process and equal protection rights under both the Utah and 
United States Constitution, and the only fair and equitable remedy is to order Appellant's 
immediate reinstatement. The district court erred in exercising discretion in applying rule 
25 RLDD when the rule required mandatory compliance. A fair and equitable remedy in 
this respect is to remand to the district court to review the Petition and its supporting 
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documents, the Confidential Committed Report and transcript of the hearing committee 
hearing and do so within the limited scope of whether Appellant has the requisite honesty 
and integrity to practice law. Finally, the present lawyer disciplinary scheme violates 
Appellants equal protection rights because he has been subjected to regulation by one 
branch of government exercising all three powers of government while all other Utah 
professions enjoy the benefit of regulation by three separate and independent departments 
of government. For this violation, a fair and equitable remedy is the immediate 
reinstatement of Appellant. For the forgoing reasons, the court is respectfully urged to 
either order the immediate reinstatement of the Appellant or remand the case to the 
district court to review the Appellants's petition for reinstatement without a hearing as 
requested on this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this /' day of November. 
A. Paul/Sefawenke, Pro Se 
Petitioner/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
DEPARTMENT OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
General Information 
PURPOSE 
The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, commonly known as DOPL, is 
one of seven agencies within the Utah Department of Commerce. DOPL is legislatively charged 
to administer and enforce specific laws related to the licensing and regulation of certain 
occupations and professions. Currently, DOPL issues licenses in approximately 50 categories of 
licensure. Additionally, the majority of these license categories include several individual license 
classifications. For example, within the nursing profession, licenses can be obtained for an LPN, 
RN, CRNA, APRN, or CNM. As of June 2001, nearly 145,000 individuals and businesses held 
licenses issued by DOPL. Annually, DOPL reviews an average of 20,000 new applications and 
processes approximately 70,000 renewal applications. To fulfill its responsibilities, DOPL's 
efforts are currently organized into two primary functions: licensing and investigations. DOPL 
also houses several independent programs specifically related to its licensing and investigative 
functions. DOPL is headed by a division director who is appointed by the Department of 
Commerce's executive director with the governor's approval. 
AUTHORITY 
DOPL's authority is found in the Occupational and Professional Licensing Act (Title 58 
of the Utah Code). Enacted by the Utah Legislature, Title 58 contains individual licensing acts 
for each occupation and profession administered by DOPL. Title R156 of the Utah 
Administrative Code contains the corresponding licensing act rules. Chapter 1 of Title 58 and 
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Chapter 1 of Title R156 are called "umbrella chapters" because they consist of general 
provisions that apply uniformly to all occupations and professions regulated by DOPL. 
However, the provisions in the specific chapters under these titles are unique to each respective 
occupation or profession. For example, Title 58, Chapter 24a is the Physical Therapist Practice 
Act, and Title R156, Chapter 24a is the Physical Therapist Practice Act Rules. Similarly, Title 
58, Chapter 22 is the Professional Engineers and Professional Land Surveyors Licensing Act, 
and Title R156, Chapter 22 is the Professional Engineers and Professional Land Surveyors 
Licensing Act Rules. The general provisions of the umbrella chapters may be supplemented or 
altered by the specific chapters, unless expressly prohibited by the umbrella chapters. 
LICENSING 
Within DOPL's licensing function, responsibilities are divided among seven separate 
bureaus focused on the licensure and regulation of similar groups of occupations and 
professions. Each bureau is headed by a bureau manager who is assisted by a board secretary, 
two or more licensing specialists, and in some cases, several auditors or other licensing or 
compliance specialists. The staff of each bureau is responsible for processing license 
applications, answering questions, and responding to other inquiries for each profession within 
its respective bureau. Professional licensure requires each applicant to meet some minimum 
standard for his or her respective occupation or profession. Policies are developed by the 
licensing boards and DOPL to determine which applications are reviewed and which applicants 
are interviewed by the respective boards. If the board is not involved in either review, clear-cut 
requirements are evaluated by DOPL's licensing staff before a license is granted to the applicant. 
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INVESTIGATIONS 
DOPL is legislatively responsible to investigate all unlawful and unprofessional practices 
as detailed in statute or rule that are performed within its regulated occupations and professions. 
DOPL's Bureau of Investigations is comprised of approximately 30 investigators who are 
trained and experienced in investigative procedures. Many of DOPL's investigators are retired 
law enforcement officers from jurisdictions throughout the state and country. DOPL's 
investigators and in-house legal counsel work closely with the Utah Attorney General's Office, 
which provides DOPL with legal assistance for licensure and investigative functions. Upon 
receipt of a complaint of unprofessional or unlawful conduct, investigative personnel enter the 
information into a computerized database. Complaints are not only posted for immediate 
investigative purposes, but also for analyzing long-term patterns of behavior. Complaints are 
confidential in nature and are not generally available to the public. However, in certain 
situations, the information contained in a complaint may be shared with other governmental 
agencies — if the other agency demonstrates a legal basis for the sharing of the information. 
Complaints are reviewed by DOPL's chief investigator or by an investigative supervisor who 
determines its priority for investigation. At times, however, DOPL is legally unable to 
investigate or take action on a complaint due to lack of authority or jurisdiction. It may also be 
determined that the complaint would be better handled by another agency. In either situation, the 
complaint would be referred to the appropriate agency for review. 
LICENSING BOARDS 
DOPL is assisted in fulfilling its responsibilities by approximately 60 professional boards 
and commissions. Each board or commission is comprised of licensees from the board's 
23 
respective profession(s) and usually includes at least one member of the general public appointed 
to represent the viewpoint and concerns of Utah's consumers. Board and commission members 
are appointed by the Department of Commerce's executive director and are confirmed by the 
governor. Nominations for board appointments may be made by members of the general public, 
by other board members, or by professional associations or groups representing the respective 
profession or occupation. A board or commission appointment generally lasts four years, and 
members may not serve for more than two consecutive terms. Additionally, due to the potential 
for conflicts of interest, board members may not serve simultaneously as officers of professional 
associations or similar organizations. DOPL's boards and commissions act in an advisory role in 
that they recommend, assist, and support DOPL in taking appropriate action in licensure and 
investigative matters. The specific responsibilities of the boards, commissions, and DOPL and 
their relationship to one another are primarily explained in the Utah Code under sections 
58-1-106, -201, -202, and -203. Many boards and commissions meet monthly. However, some 
may meet every other month, quarterly, or as needed depending on the amount of business 
scheduled for review. Board and commission meetings are generally open to the public. If 
necessary, however, they may be closed in accordance with Utah's open meetings laws. 
The following statues and rules relate to the governance of public bodies, including licensing 
boards: 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act, 63-46b 
Department of Commerce Administrative Procedures Act Rules, R151-46b 
Division Utah Administrative Procedures Act Rules, R156-46b 
Utah Rulemaking Act, 63-46a 
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Utah Rulemaking Act Rules, 15-1, 15-2, 15-3, 15-4,15-5 
Open and Public Meetings Act, 52-4 
Government Records and Access Management Act (GRAMA), 63-2 
Government Records and Access Management Act Rules, R151-46a 
PROGRAMS 
Prelitigation: The coordination of medical malpractice prelitigation panels is intended to 
expedite early evaluation and settlement of malpractice claims and to decrease the soaring 
number of malpractice suits and claims arising from health care. Call (801) 530-6945. 
Utah Recovery Assistance Program (URAP): URAP is a professional recovery program created 
to assist chemically dependent individuals who hold professional licenses. Call (801) 530-6428 
or 530-6106. 
Controlled Substance Database: This program is a resource to aid in the prevention, 
enforcement, and treatment of controlled substance abuse and diversion. This is accomplished 
through the statewide collection of all Schedule II-V controlled substance records. Call (801) 
530-6220. 
Residential Lien Recovery Fund: The Act that created this fund provides protection from 
mechanics' liens for homeowners who comply with statutory requirements. It also created a fund 
for persons who are thereby no longer able to recover payment through the mechanics' lien 
process. Call (801) 530-6104. Uniform Building Standards Act: 
UBC Commission: This act established the Uniform Building Codes Commission which 
is responsible to adopt the building codes to be enforced throughout the state. Interested parties 
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can recommend code amendments to be considered by the Uniform Building Codes 
Commission. 
Uniform Building Codes Training: This program uses a one percent surcharge on all 
building permits issued in Utah to provide statewide building codes training to building 
inspectors and individuals engaged in construction-related trades. Call (801) 530-6391. 
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